Pulmonary Embolism Essay Example | Topics and Well Written Essays - 1000 words

Pulmonary Embolism - Essay Example The clots can break free, travel to the lung, and block an artery. The condition can uncommonly be caused from fat escaping from fractured bone marrow or from amniotic fluid during childbirth. With a large clot, or many number of clots, pulmonary embolism can cause death. The process by which a pulmonary embolism forms, begins in the blood stream. Blood flows from the right side of the heart to the lungs where it picks up oxygen. The heart pumps this oxygen-rich blood through arteries delivering it to various parts of the body after which it enters another network of veins. The veins carry the now oxygen-poor blood back to the heart, which pumps the blood to the lungs to pick up oxygen again. A blood clot forming in a vein, commonly a deep vein in the leg, can travel with the blood flow back to the lungs and become lodge there.This leads to pulmonary embolism. When the lung arteries become blocked by a blood clot, high blood pressure in the lungs may occur. This results in the heart having to pump harder than usual. A continually overworked heart may enlarge and may eventually fail to function. A large pulmonary embolism can result in failure of both the lungs and heart. However, the sooner a physician can diagnose and treat the condition, increases the chances of surviving a pulmonary embolism. The symptoms of pulmonary embolism differ widel... The symptoms of pulmonary embolism differ widely and often resemble those of other conditions; the classic signs include sudden shortness of breath, chest pain and a cough that produces blood-streaked sputum. Breathing may be very rapid and breathing deeply may cause severe chest pains. Other symptoms include increased pulse rate, dizziness, and fainting. Pulmonary infarction may result if there is a lack of blood flow to the lungs causing some lung tissue to die. In addition the patient may also cough up blood-stained phlegm, have sharp chest pains, and fever. The skin may turn a bluish color from a lack of oxygen when the larger vessels of the lungs are blocked. Chronic pulmonary embolism, where small blood clots deposit themselves in the lungs repeatedly over time, will cause shortness of breath, swelling of the leg and all round weakness (MayoClinic 2006). Risk factors for a pulmonary embolus include: Prolonged bed rest or inactivity (including long trips in planes, cars, or trains), Oral contraceptive use, Surgery (especially pelvic surgery), Childbirth, Massive trauma, Burns, Cancer, Stroke, Heart attack, Heart surgery, Fractures of the hips or femur A blood clot is the first factor towards pulmonary embolism and one that forms in a vein is called a thrombus. A blood clot is a plug of platelets enmeshed in a group of red blood cells and fibrin. Blood clots usually develop to help stop bleeding an injury, but sometimes form without reason. A clot that develops in one part of the body and travels in the bloodstream to another part of the body is called an embolus. Sometimes other substances, such as pieces of a tumor, globules of fat from fractured bones or air bubbles, may enter the bloodstream and become an embolus that blocks arteries. A vein in the leg or

W.E.B. Du Bois Philosphy Essay Example | Topics and Well Written Essays - 750 words

W.E.B. Du Bois Philosphy - Essay Example In 1909, Du Bois was chosen to be among the co-founders of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP). Du Bois had strong philosophies that advocated for the blacks to be given leadership roles and ways to finish class and racial prejudices. He campaigned for political action and for the civil rights agendas using the Crisis magazine to inform the black Americans. Social change is one of the philosophies of Du Bois that is revealed in the NAACP: Rise of the Crisis, Decline of the Wizard that was published by David Levering Lewis. Du Bois argued that individuals could accomplish social changes by creating various small groups of the college educated blacks that he referred as the Talented Tenth. The leader believed that the Negro Race would be saved by their exceptional men like all the other races. He noted that the issue of education among the Negroes was first dealing with the Talented Tenth. Du Bois noted that dealing with the best in their race would provide guidance to the masses away from death and contamination of the worst (Lewis, 35-38). The philosophies of Du Bois were expressed in the early issues of the Crisis Magazine when the leader stated that his main objective was to state facts and the arguments that display the danger of racial discrimination particularly the way it was manifested towards the colored people. The crisis magazine derived its name from believes of Du Bois who was the editor, that it was a critical time in history for the advancement of men. Du Bois expressed his philosophies when he decided that the editorial page would stand for the privileges of men, regardless of their race or color, for the utmost ideals of the American democracy, and for reasonable and persistent efforts to achieve the rights and apprehend the ideals (Rabaka, 50-55). Booker T. Washington was another great leader among the black community in the late 20th century who had various disagreements with Du Bois

Cultural Aspects in India

Cultural Aspects in India If the 20th century was generally recognized to be the American century, then the 21st might very well be regarded as the Indian century. After all, following China, India has the largest population in the world. Like China, it too has a large and fast-developing economy, and it is steadily converting these economic gains into growing political power abroad. Unlike China, however, India is governed by a vibrant, participatory democracy, which, while chaotic, reflects the political values of human rights and pluralism so cherished in the West. Indeed, as countries which have long guided the West in leading the world begin to lose ground to counterparts in the developing world, India is one of the few major future powers in a position to pick up the Wests mantle of human progress and freedom. Though like the West in its commitment to democracy, India brings with a unique set of circumstances, informed by a history and culture, which stretch back for thousands of years. The common theme of Indian history has been heterogeneity. The abundant diversity found in India today was present almost from the beginning. The countrys oldest historical document, the Rig Veda, which is also a religious one, recounts a massive migration of one conceived ‘ancestor group and its intermingling with a loosely described native culture (Keay, 19-56). Scholars have found evidence of civilizations on the Indian subcontinent stretching back to times concurrent with the first city-states of Mesopotamia, Indian history (Keay, 1-18). Between the time of the Harrapan City States of around 3,000 B.C. all the way to Indias current prime minister Manmohan Singh, India has absorbed wave after wave of new peoples, new beliefs, and new ideas and added this to an already heady mix with every passing c entury. As a result, Indias startling diversity and variety were multiplied in countless directions. Nowadays there are over 400 languages spoken in India with over 14 official languages recognized according to the CIA World Factbook. Its population, which had stayed predominately rural until recent years, is becoming more urbanized, and two of the worlds five most populous cities are located there. The Indian parliamentary democracy is multi-party, regional, and highly factionalized, reflecting the drastic differences that exist between districts even within the same province. With all this diversity, it is tempting to impute irreconcilable contradictions between the types of people, institutions, and beliefs found in India. One might ask: how can one form a coherent statement about the existence of an overarching Indian culture? The answer to this has been as much a problem for government leaders as it has been for scholars, but it is one this paper will endeavor to supply in the following ways: We will discuss the major components of Indian culture (people, frames of references / communication, and group interactions) to illustrate the staggering variety of Indian cultural practices. We will focus on the notion of the Indian family and its characteristics, and attempt to make the case that the family as an institution provides a unifying theme for Indian culture, and a vehicle, which simultaneously relieves and reinforces the tectonic tensions brought on by societal diversity. We will discuss the findings of our interviews and outside readings to form a â€Å"big picture† analysis of Indian culture. II. Culture Components Gannon and Pillai supply readers with two metaphors through which to conceive of the sheer magnitude of diversity found in Indian cultural practices: the Dance of Shiva and a Kaleidoscope. In either case, there is a dynamic tension between change and stasis, creation and destruction, and the rules of general and specific; both metaphors create a framework for understanding that heterogeneity is the rule of thumb when conceiving of India as a whole. To view Indian culture in all its staggering complexity, it is necessary to begin with the component parts: people, frames of references / communication and group interactions. A. The Indian People For Westerners seeking to understand the staggering diversity found on the Indian Subcontinent, there is a helpful quote from a Hindu religious prayer, which can assist: â€Å"May good thoughts come to us from all sides† (â€Å"Religions†). Its simplicity reveals an acceptance of variety, heterodoxy and the unconventional; it turns on its head the notion of diversity being a challenge, and refashions it as an asset. To effectively argue that there is a general, overarching Indian culture, it is important to first acknowledge as true that such a culture is also served by many distinct parts, which have guided that nations historic, political, social and economic development. When considering the citizens of India, it is similarly important to perceive the numerous and stark divisions with regards to ethnic / linguistic groupings, social and economic levels, as well as religious and philosophical make-up. i. Demographics; Social and Economic Levels India is the second most populous nation in the world, having an estimated population of 1.17 billion (CIA World Factbook, â€Å"India†). Though the World Factbook only subdivides Indias immense population into four ethnic categories: Indo-Aryan (72%), Dravidian (25%), Mongoloid and other (3%), the plethora of languages spoken in India 400 at last count, plus 2,000 dialects speak to a diversity almost beyond the average Westerners comprehension. India is also a very young nation, with the mean age being 25.3, and with nearly 95% of the population under the age of 64 (CIA World Factbook, â€Å"India†). Indias population is also increasing at a brisk, if not explosive rate; it ranks 84th in the world in terms of highest growth rates higher than the United States (CIA World Factbook, â€Å"India†). Literacy is at 61%, and only 29% of the population is urban—a number which has been increasing at the slow creep of 2.4% over the last five years (CIA World Factbook, â€Å"India†). When adopting a big-picture perspective, noticeable differences appear between men and women: males tend to be younger, more literate and more educated (CIA World Factbook, â€Å"India†). Males also tend to be more plentiful earlier in life, with a higher birth rate of 1.12 males to every female, but their life expectancy is lower by almost five years (CIA World Factbook, â€Å"India†). One of Hinduisms most potent legacies, insofar as demographic effect is concerned, is Indias hierarchical caste system (Lonner; Zhang, 11 and 14). Although the caste system evolved from Hinduism for over 1000 years, some groups of other faiths such as Christians and Muslims adhere to this ancient social structure (â€Å"Religions†). Indias society reveals large gaps between the lifestyles of upper and lower class Indians; the bottom 10% hold only 3.6% of the nations wealth, where the top 10% have accumulated 31.1% (CIA World Factbook, â€Å"India†). By purchasing power parity, India is the 5th largest economy in the world, yet, it remains one of the poorest, with an estimated 53% of the population subsisting on less than one dollar a day in income (CIA World Factbook, â€Å"India†; Gannon and Pillai 469). Compounding economic difficulties are social, geographic and political realities, which prevent equal development for all. In a submission to the periodical Cultural Anthropology, writer Kaushik Ghosh describes the conflicting strains of â€Å"indigenousness, locality and transnationalism,† which combine to blunt social and economic development efforts being made in India. The reality for India is that, given its immense, far-flung borders (greater than the continent of Europe, according to WorldBusinessCulture.com), extreme geographic features, and the extreme multiplicity of the ethnic, linguistic, and religious groups, it is not possible for any change to be applied uniformly and in a way that affects all people equally. Ghosh depicts the isolated tribes of Jharkhand, India, who, in their efforts to lobby their local government and national representatives, become effectively nullified when they are lumped in with other, separate interest groups that are labeled â€Å"indi genous.† Another writer, Navtej Dhillon, shares that â€Å"the majority of Indias 150 million muslimsMuslims suffer relative deprivation when to education and access to public employment.† For a time, the Indian government had utilized socialist economic policies, and today the state is still a large player in economic development. The role taken by government can be paternalistic, and elected officials try to reward their voters and supporters with jobs and economic opportunities. Combine this economic reality with the fact that Indias multiparty, parliamentary government is characterized by heavy regionalism and identity politics, and you get the following: certain groups are sometimes purposefully excluded from lucrative government business opportunities (Bellman, â€Å"Politics Economics: Reversal of Fortune Isolates Indias Brahmins†). In an article published in the Wall Street Journal, journalist Eric Bellman describes a government policy in the State of Tamil Nadu, which allocates 69% of government jobs and public college slots for lower castes. Though this policy actually has its genesis in the Indian Constitution, which itself was formulated to correct concentrations of wealth and privilege in the higher castes, the article documents a new dimension to the state policy, which is considerably less altruistic and more partisan. Yet for all that academics, journalists and political leaders have described the staggering dimensions of social and economic inequality, it is apparent that within India itself, there is consensus insofar as a solution is concerned: education. Gannon and Pillai describe the perceived success of Indias educational sector, which, as mentioned above, has produced an enormous pool of highly-educated and specialized workers (Gannon and Pillai 504). Indias success in these areas also masks startling inequalities, namely the low literacy rates and a general lack of access to education for many people (505). Competition to rise above ones peers is inordinately tough given the limited number of slots open at public and private universities, and in secondary school, a performance test is given to determine which field of study for which a student is eligible (Cheney, Ruzzi and Muralidharan, 8). Despite the systemic challenges like a drastic lack of funding, deficient facilities, and teacher a bsenteeism, the value placed on education and knowledge is so present in Indian culture as to make â€Å"millions of students achieve at remarkably high levels.† It is this valuing of educational attainment, which has established India as a preeminent figure in high technology fields, and paved the way for long-term economic development. Despite the endemic poverty, economic development in India has given rise to a sizeable and growing middle class, which contains in its membership the â€Å"largest number of college-educated scientists and computer specialists in the world.† (Gannon and Pillai, 469). India is now looking inwards to, in the words of Indian President, Manmohan Singh, â€Å"a vast unfinished agenda of social and economic development,† to correct abuses and disparities which occur due to culture, history, politics or environment. ii. Religion and Philosophy Every aspect of Indian culture has been impacted by religion. Prominent Hindu and philosopher Swami Vivekananda stated, â€Å"Each nation has a theme in life. In India religious life forms the central theme, the keynote of the whole music of the nation† (Gannon 470). Martin Gannon wrote, â€Å"For 2000 years of its history, India was almost completely Hindu, but for the last millennium or more, Indian culture has been a synthesis of different racial, religious, and linguistic influences† (470). Tolerance has also sustained religious pluralism of Muslims, Christians, Sikhs, Buddhists, Jains, Secularists, and other persuasions (Census of India). Despite having an 80.5% Hindu population, Indian culture is not only a Hindu culture (Census of India). The other major indigenous religions in India are Jainism (0.4%), Buddhism (0.8 %), and Sikhism (1.9%), and the major imported religions are Christianity (2.3 %) and Islam (13.4%) (â€Å"Religions†). Other smaller religions comprise 0.6% of the population, and are namely, Zoroastrianism or Parsi, Bahai Faith, Jews, and tribal persons who practice the most ancient religion of animism (â€Å"Religions†). 0.1% of Indias population did not state a religion (Census of India). Hinduism is tied with the ancient Vedic tradition estimated to have formed around 1500 B.C. and had continued to be the sole religion of India up until a thousand years ago or more (Gannon, 470; Heitzman). Indian philosophy, with its thematic undercurrents of cycles, owes much to Hinduism and later dharma traditions (Gannon, 471). The dharma and ancient monastic tradition of Jainism, owes much of its religious precepts to Hinduism (Census of India; â€Å"Religions†). Experts speculate the formation of Jainism began in the 9th century B.C. by Parshvanatha whose teachings required a path of non-violence for all living beings and other practices to guide the soul to divine consciousness (â€Å"Religions†). Similarly, Buddhism was inspired by the life and beliefs of Siddhartha Gautama, or Buddha, between the 6th and 4th centuries B.C. (Census of India; â€Å"Religions†). Buddhism is a dharma religion consisting of varied philosophies, beliefs, and traditions that hav e spread to the East. Buddhists in India near the Chinese border mainly follow Tibetan Buddhism or Vajrayana, which means from Sanskrit â€Å"Vehicle of the Thunderbolt†; and those located near the Myanmar border practice Theravada, translated from Pali â€Å"Way of the Elders† (â€Å"Religions†). Sikhism was established by Guru Nanak in the sixteenth century, who attempted to reform specific Hindu tenants like eliminating the caste system, race, and gender inequities (Census of India; â€Å"Religions†). Islam arrived in India during the early eighth century; largely from the Sunni sect (Census of India; Heitzman; â€Å"Religions†). The division of the British Empire at Indias independence forced many Muslims to migrate to Pakistan and Hindus to India, but Islam still remains the largest minority religion today (Census of India; â€Å"Religions†). Indias Christian inhabitants are majority Roman Catholic, but consist of several other denominations, including both independent and consolidated Protestant churches of Church of North India and South India (Heitzman; â€Å"Religions†). Indias small community of Parsis comprises the last practitioners of Zoroastrianism, which was brought by Iranian immigrants one thousand years ago. There are small communities of Judaism, Bahai Faith, and tribal animists (â€Å"Religions†). After Indias independence in 1947, the establishment of a secular government further facilitated mutual respect of all religious practices in public society through legislation advocating neutrality in all things rooted in an individual or groups faith (Sen, 19). Notwithstanding its constitutional obligation, religion and government do still intermix, shown in the management of Hindu temples by the Tamil Nadu state government or the Sikh political party exerting full authority over the state assembly in Punjab (Heitzman). Furthermore, Indias long tradition of religious tolerance began to be challenged by fundamental ideologues starting from the 1960s. From the 1990s to the present, riots and religious-based political parties continue to impact public life and its relatively neutral governmental body (Heitzman). 1. Hindu Religion Philosophy The general premise of Hindu philosophy is that truth is organic, pluralistic, and sometimes inconsistent, and should be arrived by multiple sources, rather than dogmatic principles (â€Å"Religions†). In other words, context matters most in India, a culture that Edward Hall refers to as high-context (Hall, 101). Hinduism is an ancient polytheistic faith originating from Vedism, or simply Brahmanism, brought by invading Aryans in 1500 B.C and thus is subsequently deemed to be the oldest â€Å"living† religion (â€Å"Religions†). Hinduisms major groups are Vaishnavism and Shaivism, though membership in these groups is loose, dynamic, and vague (â€Å"Religions†). The leading sects are the Vaishnavas, who worship Vishnu god or a related avatar such as Rama and Krishna, Shaivas which worships the god Shiva, and Shaktis, a cult that worships the manifestations of Shakti, the mother goddess and companion of Shiva. Other smaller sects advocate religious reform and revival, charity to the poor, or follow the teachings of a charismatic leader (â€Å"Religions†). There is said to be â€Å"five tensile strands† in Hinduism: doctrine, practice, society, story, and devotion (â€Å"Religions†). All Hindus follow these strands to varying degrees and accept their distinct tensions and contradictions, favoring religious enthusiasm over â€Å"fundamental rigidities of practice or doctrine† (â€Å"Religions†). To achieve absolute happiness one must live beyond worldly possessions through spiritual enlightenment—a journey in search of salvation or mukti in which leads to an ethereal transcendence called moksha (Gannon, 475). Hindu philosophy guides each person on a distinct path to this exultation from worldly suffering along four fundamental avenues that often are intertwined: intense devotion or love of God (bhakti yoga), selfless work or service (karma yoga), philosophy or knowledge of self (jnana yoga), and meditation or psychological exercise (raja yoga) (Gannon, 475). The difficulty of achieving moksha in ones l ifetime is accommodated by the concept of reincarnation in which souls or jivas enter the world through Gods power mysteriously and ascend from the simplest life forms to the most complicated bodies or human form where the search for mukti begins (Gannon, 475). The degree of these three fundamental qualities is determined by the equilibrium of rights and wrongs done in past lives, called karma and is predicted by astrological charts at birth (Gannon, 476). Hinduism also gave rise to the caste system. A caste or jati (translated as â€Å"birth†) is a social organization into which someone is born. It is also a system purported to provide social support and established economic and social roles, making it the most influential contribution to Indias collective culture (â€Å"Religions†; Zhang, 11-13). There are over 2000 distinct jatis in Indian society today (â€Å"Religions†). Each member marries within the same jati and follows specific rules of behavior such as kinship, profession, and diet, and interacts with other jatis according to their social position (â€Å"Religions†). Each jati is associated with five caste clusters or varnas in descending order: Brahmans which are priests, Kshatriyas as warriors, Vaishyas which were originally peasants but now associated with merchants, Sudras as artisans and laborers, and Panchamas which historically had been excluded from the system because of their occupation an d ways in life (â€Å"Religions†). The fifth varna reveals the mechanism for determining the level of the caste: purity. The rate at which a group comes into contact with pollutants such as dung, menstrual flow, leather, dirt, hair, saliva, and blood, determines its ranking within the social caste system (â€Å"Religions†). Panchamas are avoided for fear of contamination, hence the name â€Å"Untouchables,† but the Constituent Assembly of India adopted legislation after Indias independence outlawing the reference (â€Å"Religions†). More recently, the phrase â€Å"Dalit†, which means â€Å"Oppressed†, has been utilized in contemporary India, but is officially called â€Å"Scheduled Castes† (â€Å"Religions†). One sixth of the population belonging to this caste are typically landless, have agricultural professions, and other ritually contaminating occupations such as leatherwork which is the largest Scheduled Caste (â€Å"Relig ions†). Author Richard Lannoy demarcates mutually exclusive Western conceptions of â€Å"right and wrong† or â€Å"good and evil† from Indias philosophy which stresses finding the middle way (227). Furthermore, the cyclical nature of Hindu thought lends to an â€Å"open-ended sense of perfectibility, less anguish in the face of time, a less fanatical will to achieve everything in a single lifetime† and manifests in Indias holistic, non-linear, and inductive styles of reasoning and dialogue, harmonious existence with its environment, fluid sense of time, and high Long-Term orientation (Hall, 17; Lonner; Zhang, 20). 2. Holidays, Traditions Celebrations Both religious holidays and secular celebrations are observed broadly in India, often time with the same holy day being celebrated in unique ways by the varying religious and secular communities. For example, in Hinduism the festival of Diwali plays a significant role, but is interpreted differently by other related religions, such as BuddismBuddhism, Sikhs, and Jains. In its most generic form, Diwali is the festival of lights. Easter, Christmas, Islamic New Year and many others are also broadly celebrated by the Indian populace. In addition to holidays, the religions of India tend to be very ritualistic traditions as well. One such ritual is the lighting of the lamp before the altar of Lord Brahma while saying a prayer. This lighting represents darkness, knowledge, and ignorance. It is common in many Indian homes to have an altar or a prayer room. This symbolizes the Lord Brahma as the master of creation, and thus reorients the lives of people who occupy the surrounding space towards him and themselves. Hindu women often wear the pottu or tilak, which â€Å"invokes a feeling of sanctity the wearer and others†. The different colors and forms depend on the caste and religious subdivision. Taken as a whole, all these act of devotions large and small present a pattern as to the approach a great many Indians take toward religion and spirituality: integration. Indians of all religions are also known to regularly make pilgrimages to visit certain holy or nationally evocative sites. This attribute attests t o the powerful force of religion in an Indians daily life. B. Frames of Reference / Communication In the latter half of the 20th Century, pioneering anthropologist and culture-expert, Edward Hall conceived of what he called â€Å"the silent language† of culture. By extending the notion of culture from the more well-known and studied â€Å"front-stage† elements, and exploring the rich â€Å"back-stage† of culture, Hall demonstrated how beliefs, schemas, associated meanings and symbolism could affect intercultural communication as assiduously as spoken language might. The second subdivision of the component parts of Indian culture consider the communication patterns and frames of reference utilized by society as a whole, beginning with an exploration of the expressions and general attitudes found in contemporary Indian society, continuing with a discussion of role relationships, and ending with gestures and non-verbal communication. i. Expressions and General attitudes Like few other cultures, the belief systems found in India tend to be exhaustive and encompass a variety of values and philosophical perspectives on a wide variety of issues, such as nature (environment), human nature, privacy, individuality, wealth / material possessions, social positions, government, politics, childhood and child-rearing, time, crime, violence and others. A prominent feature of Indian society, even in non-Hindu cultures, is fatalism, which is an ultimate acceptance of the hand of fate insofar as guiding ones affairs are concerned (www.communicaid.com). Fatalism is tied to the Hindu notion of Karma, that â€Å"everything happens for a reason† and breeds and encourages passivity, and a surprisingly low uncertainty avoidance score for a country with such traditionalistic cultures (www.communicaid.com). Indian society is high context and collectivist; thus a prevalent concern in all interactions is the maintenance of social relationship and the preservation of social face. As such, activities which would provoke harsh judgment from ones peers isare frowned on. Many experts have noted that successful communication in India depends on precise knowledge of the status of the individual with whom one is speaking, and the relative standing between each party. Edward Hall diagnosed India as having a high-context culture, which is characterized by indirect, face-saving and listener-centric communication styles (Hall, p. 101). In India, communication is informed by role relationships, which, reflecting the society at large, are varied and complex. ii. Role relationships Role relationships in Indian society are in some instances outgrowths of the traditional caste system, as well as religious beliefs. The Indian caste system has been and continues to be influential in everyday life of the people. The main purpose of the caste system is to bring a sense of order in the society. The caste system enables people to have their own place in society and keeps away from any conflict. Outside of the traditional, economic and religious strictures of the Caste system, India as a society is marked by high power distance and tends to embrace clearly articulated lines of authority and respect. Indians base this respect on the behavior, title, class, and status of the person with whom he or she is interacting. The status of an Indian is determined in part by his or her possession of a university degree, his or her profession, age, and caste. In terms of professions, given the deference provided to authority figures, it is considered more impressive to work for the government than the private sector. Gender-based differences also exist, despite laws to the contrary. The head of the family is almost universally the eldest male. Male chauvinism is well-established, and women do not have the same privileges as do males. iii. Gestures and Non-verbal Communication As a high context culture, Indian communicators tend to rely heavily on indirect verbal and non-verbal cues to reinforce their message. In addition, Indians rely on a variety of contextual cues for comprehending meaning. For example, the word â€Å"No† or any kind of direct refusal is absent from most Indian discourse because it implicates an aggressive, harsh, impolite, and arrogant tone. Instead â€Å"vague and open-ended answer such as ‘Ill try or ‘I will confirm with you another time† are considered acceptable answers (â€Å"India: Prosperous Entertaining Part I†). Subsequently, a â€Å"Yes† does not always imply agreement or acceptance. Extrapolated further, some of these cues have taken on a life of their own, which is separate and considered standard when interacting with others. For instance, in order to show respect, greetings are offered with what is termed the ‘namaste or the placing of both hands together as if praying coup led with a slight bow. Use of the right hand when touching people or objects is recommended; due to the cultural association, the left hand is viewed as being unclean. Head bobbles, head wobbles, and Indian head shakes refer are a common gesture found in South Asian cultures, most notably in India. The head shake is the non-verbal equivalent of a multipurpose and omnipresent Hindi word, accha, which can mean anything from â€Å"good† to â€Å"I understand.† Shaking a head sideways is taken as non approval of certain things, whereas shaking a head up and down is taken as approval, though the meaning is reversed if you are aan Indian from the South. Similarly, a side to side hand wave is frequently interpreted by Indians as â€Å"no† or â€Å"go away.† Eye contact with an elder or person in a senior position is considered very rude. Avoiding eye contact with the seniors is considered as a sign of respect. Another non-verbal taboo is to touch a persons head because it ; The head is considered sensitive and so shouldnt be touched. Likewise, one should never point with a single finger or two fingers, instead, point with the chin, whole hand or thumb. Prostrating before God and elders and touching their feet is the humblest way of conveying respect in Indian culture. Known as Sashtang Namaskar it is bowing with four limbs of the body touching the ground. Touching feet of the elders is showing respect. Staring is also acceptable, as staring at strangers is a Western cultural taboo that does not carry the same weight in India. Many people feel quite free to stare at anything, or anyone, that is different from them and as part of their culture. Interpreting this as rudeness is unproductive. C. Group Interactions The third component of culture is group interactions, which are limited here to general social interactions amongst friends, peers and professional settings. Generally summarized, interactions can be sub-categorized into greetings, visits, and meetings. i. Greetings Renowned expert organizational behavior and psychology, Dr. Madhukar Shukla, describes Indians as outgoing and friendly, an attitude that is bolstered by a sense of privacy, which is less guarded than in the West (Shukla, â€Å"India: ConversatonConversation Part 1). One should not, therefore, be surprised by the ease with which conversation is started, nor with which it covers ostensibly private subject matters. There are several different naming forms in India, which vary from region to region (Kwintessential.com, â€Å"Global-Etiquette: India-country profile†). In the north of India, it is common to see a given name, followed by a surname or family name, whereas in the south, names commonly begin with a reference to the town or region the person is from, followed by the fathers name, and then lastly their given name. Similarly, in Muslim culture, surnames are not common, instead, have a derivative of their fathers name tacked on after the given name by ‘bin if the person is a male, and ‘binti if they are a female, which in both cases means ‘of; the name ‘Hajji might also have been added if this person had made the pilgrimage to Mecca. Sikhs,Sikhs also have a unique naming system, which is the given name followed by the name ‘Singh (Kwintessential.com, â€Å"Global-Etiquette: India-country profile†). In all cases, however, it is recommended that w hen addressing someone, one should give the correct name, prefaced by Mr.† or â€Å"Mrs.†, or by his or her professional title: doctor, director, chairman/woman, and so on (Shukla, â€Å"India: First Name or Title?†). Furthermore, the same source points out that despite the variety, in many parts of India, people will conform to the Hindu style of naming, which is the most widely used. Upon entering the room, greetings should be offered first to the oldest or most senior person present; in many cases, the oldest person will be the most senior-ranked. Offering a â€Å"Namaste,† a handshake or even a pleasant â€Å"hello† is acceptable, though there are important caveats to note. Depending on the religion of the person with whom one meets if he or she is a muslimMuslim a â€Å"Salaam Wale Kum† might be more appropriate (Shukla, â€Å"India: First Name or Title?†). Handshakes are acceptable for men; however touch is a sensitive area for many Indians, so a handshake might not be as acceptable for women (Shukla, â€Å"India: First Name or Title?†). Experts suggest respecting the physical space of Indian counterparts, and any physical interactions should be at their initiative. The recommendation of the â€Å"hello† and slight wave,wave should only be acted upon if the audience is younger, as it is reasonable to assume they wou ld be familiar with this aspect of western culture. (Shukla, â€Å"India: First Name or Title?†) ii. Visiting â€Å"Hospitality is a key value in Indian culture, and the guest is considered the equivalent to god† (Shukla, â€Å"India: Prosperous Entertaining Part I†). Foreigners and Indians alike can attest to the geniality one encounters from invitations by those they just met to â€Å"drop on by† at any time. The Indian hos

Gender Roles in Ancient Greek Society Essay -- Greek Gender Roles

Gender Roles in Ancient Greek Society Throughout history, the roles of women and men have always differed to some degree. In ancient Greece, the traditional roles were clear-cut and defined. Women stayed home to care for children and do housework while men left to work. This system of society was not too far off the hunter gatherer concept where women cared for the house and the men hunted. Intriguingly enough, despite the customary submissive role, women had a more multifaceted role and image in society as juxtaposed with the rather simple role men played. Morals for the two were also different. Men obviously had the upper hand with women being the traditional passive. For an example, it was quite acceptable for a man to commit adultery- however a woman was to remain chaste. The only exception to this was if the lover in question was a god. For some odd reason, it seemed that men were allowed to be philanderers while their wives stayed at home. This is evidenced in the Odyssey quite well- Odysseus the ?hero? is free to sample all the pretty ladies he cares to, whereareas Penelope his wife is expected to fend off all the suitors at home. Predictably, Penelope melts into his arms when she realizes it is her long lost husband without pausing to consider what he has done in his absence. This reaction portrays the unequal morals of Greek society regarding gender. Euripides?s Medea portrays women who are not quite as lucky as Penelope: ?Oh, unfortunate one, Oh cruel! Where will you turn? Who will help you? What house or what land to preserve you from ill can you find? Medea, a god has thrown suffering upon you in waves of despair.? In this play, Medea?s husband Jason has left her and their children to fend fo... ...ing his daughter is excusable. Men and women lived in completely dissimilar spheres, until the time of marriage. Even after marriage, they still retained strong ties to their own spheres by Achilles and Patrocleus. This is aspect of young life is depicted by Sappho in her poems. Apparently alternative lifestyles were commonly accepted in youth and continued throughout adulthood. This passive encouragement of homosexuality further strengthened ties between the separate genders and emphasizing the differences. Human society does not really change. The roles each gender plays in society has not changed drastically since the time of the ancient Greeks, and this goes to suggest that these roles are deeply rooted and possibly genetic. However chauvinistic Greek myths are telling the truth, which explains why they have influenced modern culture to the extent it has.

Cross-National Transfer of Employment Practices in Multinationals

cross-national transfer of employment practices in multinationals Abstract This paper argues for the systematic incorporation of power and interests into analysis of the cross-border transfer of practices within multinational companies (MNCs). Using a broadly Lukesian perspective on power it is argued that the transfer of practices involves different kinds of power capabilities through which MNC actors influence their institutional environment both at the ‘macro-level’ of host institutions and the ‘micro-level’ of the MNC itself.The incorporation of an explicit account of the way power interacts with institutions at different levels, it is suggested, underpins a more convincing account of transfer than is provided by the dominant neoinstitutionalist perspective in international business, and leads to a heuristic model capable of generating proposed patterns of transfer outcomes that may be tested empirically in future research. Keywords multinationals; compa rative & cross-cultural HRM; conflict; international HRM; strategic and international management; organisational theory.Introduction Much has been written about the cross-national transfer of management practices in multinational companies (MNCs). A recent conceptual development is the ‘neoinstitutionalist’ contribution of Kostova and colleagues (Kostova, 1999; Kostova and Roth, 2002; Kostova et al. , 2008). In the international business literature, this approach shows signs of establishing a new intellectual hegemony. 1 Given this salience, critical engagement is essential. The neoinstitutionalist approach to practice transfer in MNCs has provided fundamental insights.It argues that MNCs – or to be more precise, their subsidiaries – operate under conditions of ‘institutional duality’, facing both the institutional terrain of the international firm itself and that of the host environment in which they operate. These institutional spheres exert rival isomorphic pressures which come to the fore when practices are transferred from the parent to host operations. Drawing on Scott’s (2008) institutional pillars, Kostova uses the ‘country institutional profile’ tool to characterize parent- and host-country institutions.This provides the basis for assessing ‘institutional distance’ (ID), the divergence in institutional arrangements between the parent country and host. In general, the greater the ID, the more problematic is transfer; and the harder is the ‘internalization’ of transferred practices, that is, their full assimilation to host employees’ cognitive mindsets and normative frameworks (Kostova, 1999). However, neoinstitutionalist positions on transfer in MNCs suffer from a neglect of ‘old institutionalist’ questions about power, coalitions, interests and competing value systems (e. . Stinchcombe, 1997), despite increasing attention to such questions in broa der neoinstitutionalist theory (e. g. Oliver, 1991; Greenwood and Hinings, 1996; Lawrence, 2008; Lounsbury, 2003; Tempel and Walgenbach, 2007). The key concepts of ‘institutional duality’ and ‘institutional distance’ overlook the ability of actors in MNCs to shape institutions to their needs and thus influence the transfer process. There is little sense of what is ‘at stake’ for actors in the confrontation of cognitive, normative and regulative frameworks that arise when practices are transferred.This paper discusses how the analysis of power can be incorporated into an understanding of cross-institutional practice transfer. It builds on recent work concerning MNCs as political actors (e. g. Belanger and Edwards, 2006; Dorrenbacher and Gammelgaard, 2011; Dorrenbacher and Geppert, 2011; Edwards and Belanger, 2009; Ferner and Edwards, 1995; Ferner and Tempel, 2006; Levy, 2008; Levy and Egan, 2003). It argues that power and interests of actors sha pe transfer through processes that draw on institutional resources both at the ‘macro’ level of the host business system and the ‘micro’ level of the MNC.These processes in turn shape the transformations and adaptations undergone by transferred practices. Power, it is suggested, has to be understood in its institutional context, both in that it is deployed by powerful MNC actors to shape, sustain and activate macro- and micro-level institutions – a process that neoinstitutionalists refer to as ‘institutional work’ (Lawrence and Suddaby, 2006); and in that institutional context provides actors with power capabilities with which to facilitate, block or modify transfer.The cross-national transfer of practices in MNCs is complex, with an array of possible outcomes. Transfer has several dimensions: the degree of adaptation or hybridization of practices; ‘internalization’; functionality; and directionality. The first of these refe rs to the fact that transfer is not an either/or issue; there may be degrees of transfer. The transferred practice may be modified in the course of implementation, or it may be ‘hybridized’, that is, combined with host practices (e. g. Becker-Ritterspach, 2009).Internalization denotes that, even where a practice is transferred in its original form, it may be assimilated to a greater or lesser extent to the working assumptions, cognitive understandings and normative frameworks of subsidiary employees and managers. Functionality refers to the degree to which transferred practices perform the function intended for them by powerful HQ actors, or work in ways that these actors would consider to be unintended or dysfunctional. Finally, directionality indicates that transfer does not occur solely from HQ to subsidiary, but also between subsidiaries themselves, or from subsidiaries to HQ.Thus various outcomes are possible, and one of the principal aims of this paper is to provi de a conceptual framework for understanding how power relations in MNCs influence the outcomes of practice transfer between different institutional ‘domains’. The paper illustrates the argument with empirical examples drawn from human resource and employment practices (HR&EP) in MNCs. The rationale is twofold. First, the cross-national dissemination of such practices is increasingly seen in a knowledge-based global economy as key for international competitive advantage (e. . Lado and Wilson, 1994). Second, however, HR&EP are particularly subject to host institutional influence (e. g. Rosenzweig and Nohria, 1994). Moreover, relations between employers and workforces are characterized by a ‘structured antagonism’ (Edwards, 1986) providing the basis for the ongoing exercise of power and resistance in relation to HR&EP; this structured antagonism is carried into the international sphere, on to the ‘contested terrain’ of the MNC (Belanger and Edward s, 2009). The paper first discusses a conceptualization of power in relation to MNCs.Second, it examines power capabilities and interests of different groups of actors within the MNC, in particular at HQ and subsidiary level. Finally, it marshals the arguments on power, interests and institutions to explore different transfer outcomes. Power and MNCs MNCs are powerful actors, driving economic activity in many sectors and one of the motive forces of ‘globalization’. They are also complex organizations, marked by the dispersion of power among groups, functions and operating units (e. g.Belanger and Edwards, 2009; Dorrenbacher and Geppert, 2011; Ferner and Tempel, 2006). In particular, the respective power of HQ and subsidiaries makes for the negotiation of relationships within the MNC (Ferner and Edwards, 1995). MNC actors manoeuvre among ‘institutional contradictions’ that leave considerable scope for praxis (Geppert and Dorrenbacher, 2011). Transfer can be viewed as a specific instance of HQ–subsidiary relations, in which the power capabilities of actors at each level influence outcomes. How are such capabilities to be conceptualized?This paper builds on a ‘Lukesian’ perspective (Lukes, 1975; 2005) that identifies three dimensions of power. Each may be related to the behaviour of MNC actors in the realm of practice transfer. The first concerns the nature of decisions that are made, and the deployment of resources to affect them. The second relates to conflicts around ‘non-decisions’, reflecting the ability of powerful actors to shape the agenda, exclude or include issues, and determine the processes and rules by which decisions are arrived at.The third concerns the way in which powerful actors exercise domination over others ‘by influencing, shaping or determining [their] very wants’ (Lukes, 1975: 27). As Lukes admits (2005: ch3), the notion of power as domination over other actors who may consent to domination requires the imputation of ‘real interests’ to actors (i. e. interests that are masked by the third dimension of power). Given the difficulties of the undertaking, he argues (p148) that ‘what count as â€Å"real interests† [is] a function of one’s explanatory purpose, framework and methods’.Without wishing to get enmeshed in this debate, we would note that the paper is premised on the notion that interests are constructed by MNC actors in ways that are variable and issue-specific, and the process gives rise to bundles of interests that are complex and not necessarily internally coherent (cf. Lukes, 2005: ch3). There may be a hierarchy of interests, with economic security or survival, for example, being a primary and persisting interest for most actors. Beyond that, interests may be more changeable and context-dependent.Such interests may be collective, emerging, for example, around a particular model of teamworking in a subsidiary that allocates particular roles to different groups of employees, supervisors and managers; or individual, deriving notably from personal and biographical considerations to do with career paths and aspirations within the MNC, rather than from organizational or group affiliations (see e. g. Dorrenbacher and Geppert, 2009a). Hardy (1996) has applied a Lukesian model to a business context, and her terminology is adopted here.She labels the first dimension ‘the power of resources’, which concerns power derived from the control of scarce resources, such as hiring and firing, rewards and sanctions, and expertise, in order to influence behaviour in the face of opposition. The second, ‘the power of processes’, resides in ‘organizational decision making processes which incorporate a variety of procedures and political routines that can be invoked by dominant groups to influence outcomes by preventing subordinates from participating fully in decision making’ (p7); equally, new groups may be brought, or force their way, into decision-making processes.The third dimension is labelled ‘the power of meaning’; Hardy explores the way in which organizational groups legitimize their own demands and ‘delegitimize’ those of others through the management of meaning and the deployment of symbolic actions. As a result, H actors may be impeded from exercising agency. As Levy argues (2008; also Levy and Egan, 2003), the control of meaning has important linkages with the Gramscian concept of ‘hegemony’ (Gramsci, 1971), emphasizing that the control of meaning, or the ‘discursive realm’, relates to power relations in the real economic and technological realms.In other words, in the case of MNCs, the power of meaning is built upon the resource power that derives from the primary economic activity of the firm and its constituent parts. This third dimension of power also provides a crucial l ink with neoinstitutionalist analysis, by illuminating in particular how the cognitive and normative ‘pillars’ (Scott, 2008) of institutional arrangements embody power relations and serve the interests of powerful actors, and how such pillars may be susceptible to contestation rather than being seen as external givens.While all three dimensions of power are important for an understanding of cross-institutional transfer, the power of meaning is especially crucial. When institutionalized practices are transferred cross-nationally, this hidden dimension is rendered ‘visible’ (Ferner et al. , 2005) by the collision of two sets of institutional rationalities. Transfer thus creates an important condition for the exercise of agency: that actors become conscious of taken-for-granted institutional processes (e. . Clemens and Cook, 1999; Seo and Creed, 2002). In short, transfer leads to potential conflicts of institutional rationality that are resolved through the de ployment of power capabilities. For example, individual performance appraisal and reward is a norm taken for granted and generally regarded as legitimate in ‘liberal market economies’. Even if disliked, it can only be legitimately challenged on grounds of its failure to achieve its performance-enhancing functions.But cross-institutional transfer allows the shared norms to be laid bare and challenged on grounds of alternative normative frameworks, emphasizing (for example) social equity, solidarity and fairness (e. g. Liberman and Torbiorn, 2000). MNC actors in situations of transfer: Power capabilities and organizational interests To understand transfer outcomes in the context of power relations, two questions must be addressed. First, what power capabilities do actors in MNCs possess?As an initial approximation, we explore the power capabilities of actors at HQ compared with those of the subsidiary. This reflects the thrust of arguments (e. g. Geppert and Dorrenbacher, 2011; Kristensen and Zeitlin, 2005; Morgan and Kristensen, 2006) that the relationship between the HQ and subsidiary constitute a primary axis of power relations within MNCs. Second, what interests are constructed or present in relation to transferred practices? The answer to this question requires a more nuanced analysis of actors at HQ and subsidiary level.It determines whether, given respective power capabilities, the subsidiary acts as part of a monolithic MNC bloc vis-a-vis host institutions, seeking ways of overcoming institutional constraints; or opposes HQ’s efforts to transfer. Also possible is some complex configuration of interests where some groups in the subsidiary support transfer, while others oppose it (and the same may be true of HQ actors). In other words, interests determine how power capabilities are deployed in relation to transfer.We first explore the power capabilities of MNCs as unitary entities with common organizational interests (Morgan, 2011) vis- a-vis the macro-institutional settings in which they operate. We then relax the assumption of unity and analyse separately the capabilities of HQ and subsidiary actors. Finally we examine the array of interests that are likely to be constructed around HR&EP practice transfer. The power of MNCs to shape macro-institutional settings The Kostovian approach to transfer neglects the power of MNCs to shape macro-institutional settings on two key counts.The first concerns the broader systemic context within which institutional duality is played out. Smith and Meiksins (1995) argue that the underlying global dynamics of capitalist development create ‘system effects’ that may be distinguished from institutional variations, or ‘societal effects’. The global economic system, and the associated concepts of ‘globalization’, the world market, competition, and so on, are themselves the highly institutionalized outcome of the active agency (e. g. Campbell, 200 4: ch. 5) of powerful actors, including states, supranational bodies and MNCs (e. g. Djelic and Quack, 2003; Levy and Egan, 2003).As Morgan (2011; also Sklair, 2001) argues, an emerging global managerial elite has assumed an important role in international standard-setting and transnational institution building. MNCs have played an important role in building this context. Sell (2000), for example, shows the role of US multinationals in shaping the rules of international commerce on TRIPS (Trade-related aspects of intellectual property rights) and GATS (General Agreement on Trade in Services) (see also Djelic and Quack, 2003). The interrelationship between the global system and national institutional spaces has implications for transfer.In particular, the world economic system is hierarchically structured by the power of national actors (Smith and Meiksins, 1995). ‘Dominance effects’ allude to the influence of practices developed in leading economies, sectors or firms. T hey influence all three dimensions of power. MNCs from dominant business systems have greater resource power by virtue of their economic success. They have power over processes that facilitates transfer. Such power can be at a systemic level through their ability to shape the decision-making rules governing international economic activity.It can also be more immediate, for example through the concentrated presence of MNCs from a dominant economy in a host country, as in the case of the dense networks of US subsidiaries in the UK or Ireland. This presence creates a stratum of organizations familiar with parent-country practices, and a pool of employees and managers with appropriate cognitive and normative expertise. Dominance also shapes systems of meaning as the dominant power becomes ‘hegemonic’. On the one hand, it creates a presumption by actors from dominant countries and firms that their practices have superior efficacy, providing a motive for transfer.On the other , this view may be shared by actors in the host, including policy-makers, subsidiary managers and workforces, and hence increase receptiveness to transfer. Thus transfer is smoothed because practices are accorded legitimacy by a wide range of MNC actors and are regarded as global ‘best practices’ (e. g. Pudelko and Harzing, 2007). One may therefore expect that where the transferred practice derives from a parent country that is dominant vis-a-vis the host, the inhibiting effect of ID on transfer will be reduced. Dominance effects evolve.One illustration of this is that the dominant position of US carmakers in the period immediately after the Second World War had been lost by the 1970s and 1980s, with Japanese firms assuming dominant status. Indeed, the Japanese economy as a whole achieved a dominant position in the 1980s, albeit briefly; with Japan’s ‘Lost Decade’ and major corporate bankruptcies, the US regained a position of dominance, although the conditions that underpinned this renewed dominance, such as easy access to cheap capital, also proved transient (Schwartz, 2009), illustrating the dynamic nature of dominance effects.Dominance, moreover, is felt at sectoral level as well as at the level of business systems as a whole. As the above discussion implies, American MNCs should not be seen as dominant across all sectors. The point that national institutional configurations provide conducive conditions for firms to flourish in some sectors but not in others is central to the ‘varieties of capitalism’ literature (Hall and Soskice, 2001) and also has a long history in economics through the theory of comparative advantage.The success of US MNCs in sectors like IT and pharmaceuticals, together with the relative decline of American firms in sectors like consumer durables and automotives, confirms this. In short, dominance effects, even of the hegemonic economic power, are likely to be particularly strong in the sec tors in which it has a competitive advantage, and weaker or absent in others. Secondly, Kostova and colleagues neglect that MNCs as powerful organizations commonly act as ‘rule-makers’ as well as ‘rule-takers’ (Streeck and Thelen, 2005) vis-a-vis host institutional contexts. Rule-makers’ are actors involved in ‘setting and modifying in conflict and competition, the rules with which [rule-takers] are expected to comply’ (p13). MNCs routinely engage in what Oliver (1991) calls ‘manipulation’ of institutional settings, exerting direct pressures on the sphere of policy-making (e. g. DeVos, 1981, on attempts by US MNCs in Germany to influence reform of codetermination legislation). Sometimes such pressure and rule-making is ‘passive’: in other words, host actors adapt institutional rules to what they see as the preferences of MNCs, without active intervention by the latter.An example is the move by the Irish authorit ies in the 1980s away from the previous policy of encouraging incoming MNCs to adopt post-entry closed shop union agreements and to bargain collectively; the change reflected the desire of policy-makers to promote rules they considered attractive to a new wave of largely US direct investors in sectors such as pharmaceuticals, electronics and IT where such provisions were seen as hampering investment (Gunnigle et al. , 2006). Moreover, MNCs may shape institutions in more bottom-up fashion through their distinctive practice (e. g. Djelic and Quack, 2003).Thus the scope for macro-institutional manoeuvre may exist even in highly-regulated institutional settings such as Germany. MNCs have been able to find space (e. g. Singe and Croucher, 2005; Tempel et al. , 2006) by exploiting weaknesses in formal institutions such as works councils that are quite heterogeneous in their operations (Kotthoff, 1994); and as Streeck and Thelen (2005: 14) argue, there is always ‘a gap between the id eal pattern of a rule and the real pattern of life under it’; thus the rules of codetermination in Germany are characterized by deep ambiguities reflecting the conditions under which they had been drawn up.MNCs’ power to shape processes and structures through which decisions are made is seen in their ability to engage in what Streeck and Thelen (2005) call institutional ‘layering’ and ‘conversion’, whereby existing structures are bypassed, or subtly changed in function. Singe and Croucher (2005) in their synthesis of research on US firms in Germany suggest these firms adopted a dichotomous approach of formal compliance combined with ‘content avoidance’ towards codetermination institutions, deploying power resources to ‘colonize’ works ouncils and exert ‘high levels of pressure on works councillors to divorce themselves from unions’ (p134). US subsidiaries have moved between bargaining jurisdictions to lev erage distinctions in how these operate; in one such firm, the German subsidiary’s deft institutional manoeuvring allowed it to be the first subsidiary in Europe to implement the MNC’s global variable pay model (Tempel et al. , 2006). Even where regulative systems potentially constrain action, regulations need to be invoked and enforced. In Germany or Spain, works-council-style representation has to be triggered by the workforce.There is thus a terrain of action for management to deploy power to avoid macro-institutional coercive pressures. Managers can use power over resources to raise the costs for the workforce of invoking statutory rights; thus the Spanish subsidiary of a US MNC threatened to offer only minimum statutory redundancy pay if the workforce activated its right to union representation during the redundancy process (Colling et al. , 2006). Therefore, actors are involved in a process of deploying power capabilities more or less creatively on a particular i nstitutional terrain.MNCs are able to engage in ‘institutional arbitrage’ (Morgan et al. , 2003), manoeuvring between institutional variations within a given host setting, assembling and reassembling institutional elements in a process of ‘bricolage’ to create new variants. In sectors most exposed to global competition, such as finance and business services (Morgan, 2009), or in periods of institutional instability, MNCs may have greater freedom to create innovative institutional arrangements within the dominant host framework, leading to what Thelen (2009) calls the ‘segmentation’ of business systems.The ability of powerful ‘institutional entrepreneurs’, including MNCs, to shape institutional settings is a key factor in a current strand of comparative institutionalism that questions the monolithic character of national-institutional configurations and emphasizes internal heterogeneity (e. g. Almond, 2011; Crouch et al. , 2009; Lan e and Wood, 2009; Saka, 2002). For Crouch (2005; Crouch et al. , 2009) intra-model variety is the norm rather than an anomaly, hence firms may be less bound by national constraints than much theory suggests.In practice, institutional elements are more ‘loose-coupled’, and the national model less determinant. Heterogeneity has substantial implications for the Kostovian concepts of institutional distance and ‘country’ institutional profile. While multiplicity in institutional settings has been discussed by neoinstitutionalists (e. g. Clemens and Cook, 1999; Delmestri, 2009; Oliver, 1991) and is acknowledged by Kostova et al. (2008: 997), the implications for transfer have not been thoroughly assimilated (cf. Phillips et al. , 2009).Chief among them is that MNCs’ rule-making capacity within institutional configurations may facilitate the transfer of practices – even to institutionally ‘distant’ hosts. The overall ‘country insti tutional profile’ may not be the appropriate level of analysis, and more fine-grained examination of local host arrangements may be needed. An alternative instrument, based on constructing the institutional profile of the subnational variant, would seem to offer a conceptual way forward, although practical problems may be foreseen of access to adequate subnational data on institutional arrangements.Power capabilities of MNC actors Turning now to classify the power capabilities2 of MNC actors in situations of transfer, these capabilities may be derived from the micro-institutional domain of the MNC itself, or from macro-institutional arrangements in the host (and beyond). Crucially, MNCs may use power to shape macro-level institutions, affecting the processes whereby they are established, maintained over time, revised in function or scope, or replaced by other arrangements (e. g. Knight, 1992; Lawrence, 2008; Lawrence and Suddaby, 2006). Agency is not confined to HQ policy-mak ers.Actors in the subsidiary have their own sources of power. Where power capabilities of different kinds are disseminated across organizational levels, groups and individuals within a MNC, pressures to adopt transferred practices are susceptible to deflection, avoidance, negotiation or challenge by subordinate actors (cf. Oliver, 1991). In order to predict transfer outcomes, it is therefore necessary to assess the balance of capabilities between the centre and the subsidiary (Dorrenbacher and Geppert, 2009b). However, while there has been much discussion of the decentred or ‘networked’ nature of contemporary MNCs (e. . Andersson and Holm, 2010) an authoritative central HQ remains the norm. As Egelhoff (2010) argues, network structures provide inadequate ‘vertical specialization’, which is required to perform functions such as providing accountability to shareholders and imposing ‘tight-coupled’ coordination on units where careful synchronizati on of operations is required. Thus, the overall power of HQ positions it as a ‘field dominant’ (e. g. Levy, 2008) in relation to the organizational field constituted by the MNC. The power capabilities of headquarters actors.HQ actors have specific capabilities relating to each of the dimensions of power. The first aspect of HQ micro-institutional power is control of the allocation among subsidiaries of key organizational resources, such as finance, investment, and knowledge and expertise, through budgeting and management control processes. Decisions over resource allocation have critical impacts on the economic security and survival of subsidiaries. HQ also controls career opportunities and rewards of key subsidiary actors; recalcitrance may jeopardize remuneration or career advancement, particularly where aspirations are international (e. . Dorrenbacher and Geppert, 2009a). However, as discussed below, power resources are unlikely to be monopolized by HQ. Moreover, the ‘big guns’ at HQ’s disposal, such as the threat of closure or investment allocation, may be disproportionate weapons for resolving ‘downstream’ conflicts over the transfer of HR practices; and the threat of closure may be unavailable if an MNC’s investment is ‘market-seeking’ or ‘resource-seeking’, rather than ‘efficiency-seeking’. If a subsidiary is performing well economically, it is less likely to be penalized for not adopting transferred HR practices.Conversely, poorly-performing subsidiaries are more vulnerable to pressure from HQ to conform (e. g. Tempel et al. , 2006). Thus there is considerable scope for HQ–subsidiary negotiation (cf. Ferner and Edwards, 1995). Turning, second, to power of processes, within the MNC there is a transnational authority structure that legitimates the exercise of power by hierarchically senior actors (units, groups, individuals, etc. ). Formal hierarchical auth ority shapes the way decisions are made and resources allocated within the firm (cf.Hardy, 1996). HQ’s role as apex of the authority structure gives it the power to determine mechanisms for transferring practices to subsidiaries abroad. In particular, it can specify which actors at which level are able to intervene in decisions, for example on the introduction of a new global HR policy. Decision-making rules frame how practices are codified into policy and transferred to subsidiaries. Generally, HQ can define formal policies for subsidiaries with a prima facie expectation that subsidiaries comply.It can impose enforcement and monitoring mechanisms and benchmark practice across subsidiaries, facilitating transfer. Finally, HQ has power over meaning. It can influence cognitive and normative aspects of the micro-institutional frame of action by shaping corporate cultures, codes of practice and standard operating procedures, which then become institutionalized. This ‘third face’ of power helps shape the mindsets of those in subsidiaries whose job it is to implement transferred policy.Research suggests that formal policies need shared understandings in order to function effectively (Ferner, 2000). HQ actors control the creation of ‘legitimatory rhetorics’ (Suddaby and Greenwood, 2005) concerning, for instance, ‘competitive advantage’, profitability, or site closures (Erkama and Vaara, 2010). This is important where there is ‘causal ambiguity’ about the impact of a transferred practice in the subsidiary (Szulanski, 1996), which may be the case particularly for ‘downstream’ activities such as HR (Boxall and Purcell, 2011).HQ actors can also shape meaning systems in subsidiaries by, for example, recruiting key host individuals whose mindsets are less typical of host norms and more in tune with organizational norms (Evans and Lorange, 1989); this allows them to bypass barriers to ‘internaliza tion’ and helps create alternative micro-institutional settings within the host institutional context. The power capabilities of subsidiary actors Subsidiary actors have the capacity to challenge transfer and protect host institutional arrangements.There has been much work in recent years conceptualizing subsidiaries as active strategizers within the wider MNC (e. g. Belanger et al. , 1999; Bouquet and Birkinshaw, 2008; Dorrenbacher and Geppert, 2009b; Dorrenbacher and Gammelgaard, 2011; Kristensen and Zeitlin, 2005; Morgan and Kristensen, 2006), rather than passive transmission belts for HQ policies and practices. The ability to strategize depends on power capabilities stemming from both the micro-level of the MNC and the macro-level of the host institutional environment.Considering first the micro-political power of subsidiary actors, subsidiaries may achieve power over resources from the competent performance of their productive activities (e. g. Andersson and Forsgren, 19 96). For example, they may generate a substantial proportion of the MNC’s profit,3 offer access to key markets, create competitively significant knowledge or expertise, or perform functions that are critical to the success of the firm’s value chain (Dorrenbacher and Gammelgaard, 2011). Possession of resources allows subsidiaries to negotiate to some degree its relationship with HQ.Power over processes is primarily the province of HQ and the hierarchical authority structure, but not exclusively so. Subsidiaries may use their bargaining power deriving from control of resources to achieve a modification of decision-making processes, with an impact on transfers. For example, in a US engineering firm, HR managers from subsidiaries generating a large proportion of global revenue won a revision of the policy-making process that accorded them a greater role in the definition of global HR policies (Edwards, T. et al. , 2007).In terms of transfer, the exercise of process power i s likely to result in policies that are more sensitive to host institutions, and hence more easily transferable. HQ is also likely to dominate power over meaning, yet subsidiaries again may have some influence at least to contest dominant systems of meaning within the organization. The transfer of practices and their associated meaning systems across institutional spaces makes visible taken-for-granted normative and cognitive frameworks and hence renders them susceptible to purposive action.One example is the transfer of workforce diversity policies to the UK subsidiaries of US MNCs. Transfer exposed underlying discourses concerning the ‘business case’ and ‘equal employment opportunities’, through the collision of very different diversity rationalities in the US and the UK (Ferner et al. , 2005). Another instance is an attempt by an American business services firm to implement a global performance-related pay scheme for professional consultant staff in the German subsidiary.These employees strongly opposed the new system which clashed with normative frameworks of fairness and was seen as leading to culturally unacceptable pay differentials (Almond et al. , 2006: 138-9). MNC’s micro-institutions are beset with ambiguities, complexities and inconsistencies, particularly when applied to real choices in a complex business world. These give actors room for idiosyncratic interpretation of norms and rules. Even if subsidiaries do not have the power to shape micro-institutional frameworks of meaning, they can selectively respond to ifferent parts of a complex configuration. In short, rival micro-institutional norms provide alternative rhetorics legitimating – or de-legitimating – particular courses of action (Suddaby and Greenwood, 2005). Within the HR function, whose activities are largely ‘downstream’, one source of ambiguity is that they may be only partially ‘nested’ within ‘upstreamâ⠂¬â„¢ strategic objectives related to competition, profitability and growth. In other words, they may have ‘relative autonomy’. HR&EP norms may be at odds with upstream norms concerning economic performance, and can be deflected on that basis.Where transferred HR practices are seen as disrupting existing relationships or practices regarded as functional for subsidiary performance, subsidiary actors may deploy what Suddaby and Greenwood (2005) term ‘ontological rhetorics’ asserting the existential incompatibility of economic goals and transferred HR practices. Even within the HR domain, there may be contradictions within highly complex normative frameworks; for example, between principles of pay determination and approaches to union recognition.Thus UK subsidiary managers in one US MNC resisted a global pay freeze on the grounds that it conflicted with a competing corporate norm of favouring non-union employee relations (Almond and Ferner, 2006). In short, s ubsidiary actors can exploit rival appeals to legitimacy within the MNC, and are likely to do so when they oppose transfer. Turning to macro-institutional resources, subsidiary actors derive power capabilities from their status as skilled negotiators of the host institutional context, both of the overarching national-institutional framework, and the subnational niches and variants in which they are located.Where the subsidiary operates essentially as the willing local agent of the wider MNC, these powers may be used to promote transfer. However, where conflicts of interest exist between subsidiary and HQ, the same capacities may be used to block or amend transferred practices. First, subsidiaries derive power resources from the ‘institutional complementarities’ (Hall and Soskice, 2001) of the host business system that generate certain competitive advantages.Given the increasing importance of intra-model variants, subsidiaries’ local embeddedness is often crucial for the generation of resources such as scarce knowledge and expertise of value to the economic activity of the MNC, and that the MNC cannot otherwise access (Andersson and Forsgren, 1996; Dorrenbacher, and Gammelgaard, 2010; Sorge and Rothe, 2011). Almond (2011) points to the significance of locally embedded ‘flexible high-skills ecosystems’ that drive innovation and provide actors with power resources for shaping practice transfer.Second, the regulatory framework of the host gives subsidiary actors some purchase over the ‘power of process’ by exerting coercive isomorphic pressures, for example in employment relations and the workings of the labour market. Thus German codetermination legislation gives employees rights to representation on company supervisory boards, and to set up works councils with statutory rights over a range of work-related issues. Changes to payment systems resulting from transferred pay and performance practices are subject to codete rmination.Even where the MNC deploys resources to mitigate this loss of process control (see above), it nonetheless increases the costs for MNCs of shaping decisions, and necessitates some degree of negotiation with local actors and/or the application of power resources. Thus the power of process provides subsidiary actors with a capability to resist practice transfer. Third, subsidiary actors are able to exploit host institutional settings to challenge dominant actors’ power of meaning in the MNC.In particular, significant macro-institutional capabilities derive from subsidiary actors’ competence as skilled interpreters of the host institutional frame. In other words, they can shape the normative and cognitive understandings of what is possible, desirable and contextually rational. Even the most highly regulated and juridified systems leave spaces for interpretation based on expert institutional knowledge. More subtle and tacit cognitive and normative elements of inst itutional frameworks are even more subject to insider exegesis.While subsidiary actors may use such institutional expertise to further transfer, in situations of interest conflict with HQ, they may equally draw on such capabilities to construct a rhetoric legitimating opposition to transfer. Naturally, subsidiary actors’ interpretations of the viability of transfer are liable to challenge and counter-interpretation, notably by expatriate managers, and sceptical HQ actors may demand that local managers’ claims be thoroughly tested. This may especially be the case where dominance effects are present, notably in US MNCs which may have a strong presumption of the efficacy of HQ practices (e. . Almond et al. , 2006; Tempel et al. , 2006). Again, therefore, the host institutional context provides a ‘contested terrain’ (cf. Edwards and Belanger, 2009; also Geppert and Dorrenbacher, 2011), in which interest groups at different levels within the MNC struggle to fur ther their agendas. A final point concerning the power capabilities of subsidiary actors is that their ‘issue-scope’ of power (Lukes, 2005: 74-5) – the range of issues over which an actor can determine outcomes – is likely to be limited because of the overall power of HQ.As a result subsidiaries are likely to have to prioritize the issues over which they expend capabilities that are scarce relative to those of HQ actors. Moreover, their power is likely (again using Lukes’ terminology) to have a lower ‘contextual range’, to be largely restricted to the specific institutional setting in which they operate; whereas that of HQ is likely to be more ‘context-transcending’, deployable under a wider range of circumstances, especially where dominance effects come into play.A possible exception to this is where the subsidiary is located in a host that is more ‘dominant’ in the global economy than is the MNC’s coun try of origin. This may provide greater context-transcending capacity to the subsidiary, leading for example to additional possible transfer outcomes such as ‘reverse diffusion’ (Edwards and Ferner, 2004) in which practices are transferred from subsidiary to HQ. These arguments are summarized in Table 1. [Table 1 about here] MNC actors and interests in the context of HR&EP transferWe are now in a position to examine HQ and subsidiary interests in relation to transfer. Together with the power capacities of HQ and subsidiary explored above, the constellation of interests will determine the ‘stance’ of subsidiary actors towards transferred practices. Who are the relevant MNC actors in situations of institutional duality and transfer? A first approximation is to divide actors into those associated with the headquarters perspective and those in the subsidiary.In reality, finer-grained distinctions may become necessary to include for example actors at regional or business-unit headquarters with interests and power capabilities distinguishable both from those of corporate headquarters and national subsidiaries. Moreover, HQ is not a homogeneous block but comprises different groupings (e. g. by management function and level) with potentially different interests in relation to transfer. At subsidiary level, a core distinction is between managers and workforce (Edwards and Belanger, 2009).There may be both common and divergent interests. Managers and workforce may both have an interest in the site’s survival, for example. In contrast, particularly where the impact of a transferred practice on the site’s performance is ambiguous or contested, interests may diverge. Depending on the practice, further disaggregation may be appropriate; for example, subsidiary operations managers may see the transfer of practices such as teamworking as useful for efficiency while HR managers may oppose transfer on the grounds that they disrupt existin g accommodation with employees.An important distinction is between managers whose career ambit lies within the host country and those whose careers trajectories and aspirations are international in scope (Dorrenbacher and Geppert, 2009a; Morgan and Kristensen, 2006). The former may engage in ‘subversive strategizing’ (Kristensen and Zeitlin, 2005), acting counter to HQ norms and prescriptions in order to strengthen the effectiveness of the subsidiary; while the latter may have less stake in the site’s survival, and see it as in their career interest to overcome local obstacles to transfer.Nor is the subsidiary workforce necessarily homogeneous. There may be differences of interest between high-skilled workers with core competences and lower-skilled workers with more generic competences, and transferred practices may differentially impact on such interests. Whether subsidiary actors deploy capabilities to resist or promote transfer will depend on how the practices affect existing interests. Resistance or contestation is likely to emerge under conditions of ‘criticality’, that is where the issue is seen as critical to the interests of actors in the subsidiary.For example, resistance may be expected where a transferred practice embodies institutional norms or requirements that disrupt accommodations seen as vital to the effective conduct of the economic function of the subsidiary, and hence to the economic security, rewards and career interests of groups and individual actors in the subsidiary. Where a transferred practice disrupts workforce interests but not those of managers (or vice versa), there is likely to be an ‘internalization’ of the clash of rationalities within the host.In the area of HR&EP, it is more likely that interests in the subsidiary will be differentiated, with say employees and their representatives resisting transfer, while managers promote it. This may be manifested in management–workforc e conflict, or as Tempel et al. (2006) suggest, subsidiary managers may function as a ‘Trojan horse’ for imported practices such as global performance management systems, working to neutralize institutional obstacles. Transferred practices may selectively disrupt interests of particular management groups, or particular workforce groups, or both.In such cases coalitions of support for and opposition to transfer may be complex and cut across the management–workforce divide. However, where transfer disrupts a wide range of subsidiary interests, a subsidiary-wide oppositional coalition may emerge. Power, institutions and transfer outcomes These arguments are now synthesized into a model of transfer outcomes, in which constellations of institutional distance, macro- and micro-level power capabilities, and actors’ interests determine the fate of transferred practices.We argue, first, that there is a need to revise the Kostovian idea (e. g. Kostova, 1999) that MN Cs operate between fairly fixed institutional entities, as implied by the notion of ‘institutional distance’. The impact of ID upon transfer is modified by the power of MNCs in two ways. In the first place, dominance effects, where they exist, smooth transfer by providing MNCs with abundant power over resources, power of process over the rules of the game, and power to manage meaning by reducing normative opposition to dominant-country practices in the host.In the second place, the power of MNCs as active rule-makers, engaging in ‘institutional work’ to construct institutional variants or niches within the host setting, mitigates the constraining impact of institutional distance. In order to incorporate these considerations, we therefore propose that Kostova’s notion of institutional distance, which we refer to as ‘raw’ ID, be replaced by the concept of modified ID, (mID). Here, the predictions of our framework are significantly differen t from those of Kostova’s.Second, transfer outcomes depend on the specific configuration of power capabilities and interests of actors at different levels of the MNC. Where interests of subsidiary and HQ actors are broadly concordant, the power capabilities of the subsidiary are likely to be deployed in a manner supportive of transfer, for example by removing or circumventing host institutional obstacles to transfer. However, where there are strong interests within the subsidiary in conflict with those of HQ, the outcome is likely to be an oppositional stance.This does not necessarily entail overt resistance (cf. Oliver, 1991). Power capabilities may be deployed to resist, modify, neutralize, or ‘quarantine’ the transferred practice through ritual observance that does not affect real practice. Which of these oppositional outcomes occurs is likely to depend on the homogeneity of interests within the subsidiary, and the power capabilities of the subsidiary (or at l east of oppositional actors) relative to those of HQ.An outcome of ceremonial compliance in which nonconformity is masked by a ‘facade of acquiescence’ (Oliver, 1991: 154) is likely where opposition is high due to a collision of normative/cognitive frameworks (e. g. concerning what will promote unit profitability in the subsidiary), but where subsidiary actors’ control of resources and/or processes is relatively low, precluding overt resistance. Alternatively, opposition may lead to adaptation or ‘hybridization’ (e. g. Becker-Ritterspach, 2009; Szulanski and Jensen, 2006) in which the practice acquires elements characteristic of the host setting.In some cases, this may make a practice more effective within the host, or allow it to be internalized by subsidiary employees. Survey evidence suggests that it is common for MNCs to disseminate practices by means of broad framework policies, with local adaptation being expected in HR&EP areas such as perform ance management, variable pay, and employee involvement (Edwards, P. et al. , 2007). This may be termed ‘functional hybridization’. In other cases hybridization may divert a practice from its normal function and hence subvert HQ’s intention.For example, a supposedly standardized employee performance appraisal system in a US MNC operated with major variations in practice: thus in the German subsidiary the works council was able to reject individual assessment, minimize quantification, and reduce the scheme to occasional informal, unrecorded evaluations (Liberman and Torbiorn, 2000). Such ‘resistive hybridization’ is likely where transfer disrupts internal accommodations and/or is seen as dysfunctional for subsidiary performance, and where subsidiary actors have sufficient power capabilities, such as interpretive control of local meaning frames.Third, the three ‘dimensions’ of power are likely to affect transfer outcomes in different ways, other things being equal. Where a subsidiary has significant power of resources, this is likely to facilitate a bargaining process in which the terms of entry of a transferred practice are negotiated between subsidiary and HQ. Where a subsidiary has significant power of process, it may use it to influence how global policies or practices are designed within the MNC, for example by contributing to central policy-making bodies.This provides it with the opportunity to ensure that the transferred practice is from the start compatible with the cognitive/normative (or indeed regulatory) frames of the host. Finally, a subsidiary may be skilled in the management of meaning, whether in highlighting – or concealing – normative/cognitive discrepancies provoked by the transfer of a practice, or by mobilizing appropriate legitimatory discourses within the micro-institutional sphere of the MNC. This power may affect transfer outcomes in different ways.Where the subsidiary’s stance is oppositional, it may evoke host macro-institutional impediments, drawing on its skilled interpretation of ‘institutions-in-practice’. Equally, where its other power capabilities are relatively weak, it may use its skills in managing meaning to construct the ‘ceremonial’ aspects of the practice without impinging on the subsidiary’s core activity. Where the subsidiary’s stance is supportive of transfer, the power of meaning may be brought to bear to secure the ‘internalization’ (Kostova, 1999) of transferred practices.Returning to the outcome parameters outlined in the introduction, we can synthesize the above arguments (see table 2) in terms of typical scenarios, based on differentiation of functionality, internalization, adaptation and directionality. The table indicates that the conditions most conducive for successful transfer in which functional practices are internalized are where: HQ actively wants to transfer pract ices, ID is low, dominance effects are high, institutional space is high, HQ’s power capabilities are relatively strong, HQ and subsidiary interests are concordant and the interests of subsidiary actors are homogeneous (model 1).To take a stylized example, a US business services firm – i. e. an MNC from the hegemonic business system, in a sector in which that business system is internationally dominant – transfers a performance appraisal system to its professional employees in its non-unionized Irish subsidiary as part of the global dissemination of standardized HR policies. Many of the employees have worked for American firms before – US MNCs predominate among foreign employers in Ireland – and have studied or worked in the US.Their cognitive/normative frames are attuned to American performance-management systems, especially since there is a strong values-based corporate culture, and there are unlikely to be discordant interests with regards to th e policy, so the practice is likely to be easily ‘internalized’. There are few macro-institutional constraints to the introduction of such policies and few variant constraints stemming e. g. from the presence of trade unions. This can be contrasted with five other scenarios.As ID increases and capabilities, particularly resources, controlled by the subsidiary grow, the prospect of transfer taking the form of functional hybridization increases (model 2). To illustrate, a US electronics MNC attempts to transfer a performance-related pay system to the more constrained and institutionally distant context of Germany. 4 There is a perceived disjunction between the policy and cognitive/normative frames of employees, i. e. the cross-institutional transfer reveals the cognitive/normative underpinnings of the system.The subsidiary is large, successful and powerful, giving it power over resources with which to negotiate with HQ a modification of the practice – for example, by reducing the amount of pay at risk, to make it more acceptable within the host context (e. g. Tempel et al. , 2006). Where dominance effects weaken, institutional space is more constrained, the subsidiary possesses significant power of resources and process relative to HQ, and has divergent interests from HQ, then the likelihood of resistive hybridization and low internalization rises (model 3).For example, Lindholm et al. (1999) show how performance appraisal systems in Nordic MNCs in China were subverted because the systems provoked extensive clashes with cognitive/normative frames, e. g. with regards to the priority given to performance rather than seniority, and issues around loss of face and around managerial authority in setting targets. If dominance effects are absent, ID is high, and subsidiary interests clash with HQ’s, transfer may fail altogether (model 4).To illustrate, a British MNC seeks to internationalize a policy of outsourcing support functions to reduce labour costs. It pressurizes foreign subsidiaries where the ratio of outsourced workers to internal employees is significantly lower than in UK domestic operations. This is the case in the German subsidiary, one of the largest in the company and with important production facilities for key products.Subsidiary managers are sceptical as to the efficiency of outsourcing and the HR manager uses his detailed knowledge of German employment law to circumvent the need to outsource functions (e. g. Tempel, 2002). Where institutional space is moderate, the subsidiary is not particularly powerful (in resource or process terms) in relation to HQ, and has quite different interests to actors at HQ, the prospects for ceremonial adoption are at their highest (model 5). To take a stylized example, a British MNC attempts to internationalize its comprehensive diversity management practices.In its medium-sized production facilities in Germany, there is considerable scepticism among managers and primari ly male employees as to the business case for diversity management. Lacking power of resources or process to openly block HQ practices, managers go through the motions of introducing diversity management measures, for example by organizing social events under the label of diversity management, but do not implement real changes in recruitment processes to encourage more female applicants or introduce diversity awareness training for employees.Finally, where interests are concordant and where the subsidiary’s power capabilities are considerable – especially when its institutional embeddedness allows it to develop scarce resources of value to the wider MNC – conditions exist for ‘reverse transfer’ (model 6). That is to say, practices operating in the subsidiary are transferred to headquarters (Edwards and Ferner, 2004). These conditions are heightened in situations of ‘reverse dominance’, that is where the subsidiary’s host system i s more dominant than the MNC’s parent system.For example, a German chemical company developed a global system of bonus pay for executives that was modelled closely on schemes already developed in the US subsidiary of the company (Ferner and Varul, 2000). These models are not, of course, exhaustive: other outcomes are possible; and the same transfer outcome may be obtained through different combinations of variables. But they illustrate the heuristic value of the approach. It should be noted that a certain degree of interaction of explanatory variables is likely.For example, MNCs from dominant parent countries are likely to be able to influence subnational variety because of their greater capacity for rule-making rather than mere rule-taking behaviour. [Table 2 about here] Conclusion This paper has argued for a revision of the Kostovian approach to practice transfer in MNCs in two key respects: systematically incorporating actors’ power capabilities, and taking account of how power ‘problematizes’ ID by rendering it more susceptible to the purposive action of MNC actors.We have argued for an analysis of power that incorporates both macro-institutional and micro-institutional capabilities of MNC actors in which these are able to a greater or lesser extent to manipulate and construct elements of the institutional settings in which they operate. The implications of the argument are methodological as well as conceptual. First, there is a need to develop credible measures of the variables in the model. The concept of mID implies the need to assess dominance effects, for example, and these will vary according to the pairs of parent and host business systems in play; dominance may also vary e. . by sector. Much work needs to be done on measuring notions such as institutional space, and to map the dimensions that characterize institutional variants. This has to be accomplished at a disaggregated level: notions of ‘country institutional profile’ may be too crude where MNCs’ power allows them to construct niche institutional ‘micro-climates’. One of the most difficult tasks is to operationalize actors’ power capabilities and to empirically assess different levels of capabilities in relation to resource, process and meaning.Moreover, empirical tools capable of identifying and distinguishing interests are needed, a task complicated by the fact that while some underlying interests may be long-term and durable – for example, around organizational survival – others may well be issue-specific, constructed anew around each instance of transfer. These points suggest a critical role for in-depth case studies. They allow deeper exploration both of the process of transfer and of how transferred practices are implemented in the routine life of the subsidiary.They are more suited than surveys to developing nuanced operationalizations and unpicking the complexities of power, how dif ferent kinds of power capabilities are deployed by different actors in the transfer process, and how configurations of interests are constructed around different transfer cases. They are more appropriate for exploring in depth the way transferred practices operate in reality. Finally, there is the question of the generalizability of these arguments to other areas of management activity.Inasmuch as transfer provokes challenges to existing modes of action and to institutional frameworks, much of the same processes of power are likely to be observed in other areas. The cross-national transfer of technical know-how, for example, exposes underlying cognitive assumptions about how the production of knowledge and development of products should be organized (e. g. Lam, 1997; Szulanski and Jensen, 2006). It is also likely to create conflicts of interest over control of knowledge as a resource, or concerns about the impact of transferred knowledge on the structuring of activities and actorsâ €™ roles in the recipient unit.Beyond that, however, HR&EP may have distinctive characteristics, relating partly to the structured antagonisms between capital and labour (Edwards, 1986). More immediately, as a ‘downstream’ business activity, HR&EP is particularly prone to the normative principles that may be at odds with the prescriptions of upstream strategy, increasing the space for actors to exploit micro-institutional ambiguities between, for instance, directives on growth, profitability or efficiency on the one hand, and principles of employee management on the other. Funding statementThis research was supported by funding from the Economic & Social Research Council, grant numbers R000-23-8350 and RES-000-230305. Notes [? ] According to Scopus, the number of citations for three of Kostova’s articles concerning transfer (as at 15th September 2011) are as follows: Kostova, 1999: 321; Kostova and Zaheer, 1999: 329; Kostova and Roth, 2002: 281. 2 The term â €˜capabilities’ is preferred to ‘resources’ since power over resources constitutes only one dimension of power (one that is the focus of resource-based views of power that predominate in the business literature). Perceptions of profitability in an MNC can be shaped